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A study of governance practices in corporate 
foundations
Sérgio Ephim Mindlin
Estudo das práticas de governança em fundações 
empresariais
É crescente a realização de investimentos sociais por meio de 
fundações empresariais e, portanto, é importante que se aprofunde 
o estudo da sua governança. Governança é conceituada como 
conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo e controle para superar os 
chamados conflitos de agência, originários da separação entre 
propriedade e gestão das empresas, conceito também aplicado a 
organizações sem fins lucrativos. Argumenta-se que as fundações 
empresariais apresentam características tanto das empresas quanto 
das organizações da sociedade civil, o que as distingue das orga-
nizações desses dois setores. Neste trabalho, analisa-se estudo em 
que um conjunto de mecanismos de governança, adaptados a partir 
daqueles identificados na literatura de governança de empresas e 
organizações sem fins lucrativos, foi selecionado para pesquisa. É 
um estudo de casos, descritivo e exploratório, em que se colheram 
e se analisaram dados sobre oito organizações por meio de publi-
cações e entrevistas com seus principais executivos. A análise dos 
dados indica ser adequado distinguir entre os tipos organizacionais 
e aplicar a teoria de agencia. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam 
que os mecanismos de governança são passíveis de adaptação e 
aplicação nas fundações empresariais. Entretanto, na realidade 
analisada são aplicados apenas parcialmente, o que sugere a neces-
sidade de ampliar os estudos que possam consolidar essas práticas 
nessas organizações.
Palavras-chave: fundações empresariais, governança, teoria de   
 agência.
1. INTRODUCTION
Two relatively recent phenomena in the Brazilian corporate context have 
been attracting the attention of managers and researchers and their interrelation 
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is worthy of studies, for one to understand them better: the in-
crease in private social investment by businesses and the rising 
demand for transparent and effective governance mechanisms, 
not only in businesses but in not for-profit organizations as well.
The first phenomenon has been evolving since the late 
1980s, together with the end of the military dictatorship 
and Brazil’s re-democratization, topped with the “Citizen’s 
Constitution” in 1988. In parallel to the stronger political 
participation of organized civil society, businessmen began 
to promote, support or implement social projects, dedicating 
private resources to public ends, either directly through their 
companies or through institutes or foundations specifically 
created for that purpose. Examples of this involvement include 
organizations that brought together these initiatives, such as 
the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights, instituted by 
toy manufacturers in 1990, the Ethos Institute – Business and 
Social Responsibility, created by business leaders in 1998, and 
Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas (GIFE – Group 
of Institutes, Foundations and Enterprises), created in 1995 to 
congregate business organizations that promote social invest-
ment. GIFE tripled its number of member organizations in ten 
years, adding community, family and independent foundations 
as well, besides corporate ones.
Concomitantly, in 1995, a group of entrepreneurs, execu-
tives and academics founded the Brazilian Institute of Corporate 
Directors (Instituto Brasileiro de Conselheiros Administrativos 
– IBCA), with the objective of strengthening the performance 
of this supervisory and control business organ. This initia-
tive derived from the Corporations Law (Lei das Sociedades 
Anônimas) of 1976, which made corporate boards manda-
tory in publicly-listed companies, besides other mechanisms, 
with the objective of improving investors’ security. In 1999, 
IBCA changed its name to Brazilian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa 
– IBGC), a sign of the strengthening of the requirement that 
more effective and transparent business management practices 
be adopted in the economic universe of the Brazilian market.
These two changing vectors met in their evolution as private 
resources – financial, human, technological – from companies 
and businessmen flowed toward social actions. It became com-
mon to hear that nonprofits should be managed as businesses, 
and a natural demand was created for this private social invest-
ment to be the object of governance practices, if not identical, 
at least similar to those adopted by corporate governance.
Although demand was configured, the efforts to materialize 
this tendency are recent and rare, be it as legal codes, be it in 
the form of normative propositions and technical or academic 
studies. This paper, whose analyses are based on an exploratory 
study carried out with a sample of corporate foundations dedi-
cated to private social investment, aims at taking one more step 
toward understanding the potentialities and limitations of the 
application of governance practices to the management of the 
so-called Third Sector organizations.
2. THE INVESTIGATION PROBLEM
Corporate foundations, in recent years, have acquired a 
significant role in the context of organizations whose efforts aim 
at reducing Brazilian social-economic problems and at giving 
the population ample access to cultural products. It is therefore 
important to clarify what is meant by Private Social Investment 
(PSI), the context in which it occurs, and the importance of the 
governance theme for these organizations.
In general, PSI designates the financing and implement-
ing of voluntary social, cultural and environmental actions by 
companies, families and individuals for the benefit of society 
as a whole or of specific segments, in general less favored. 
This phenomenon showed significant growth in Brazil from 
the 1990s onward.
Different companies adopted one of two organizational 
models to promote this form of contribution to society: creating 
areas responsible for this activity within their own businesses 
or instituting dedicated PSI foundations or institutes. From 
the business strategy viewpoint, both models are practically 
equivalent. From the administrative viewpoint, however, each 
presents different issues in terms of management models, as-
signment of responsibilities, decision-making structures and 
performance verification, among others factors.
The first model creates within the companies themselves 
an area specialized in social, cultural and environmental ac-
tions that is part of the organizational structure, just like other 
departments commonly found in businesses, such as the finance, 
marketing and other functional areas. The difference among 
them is that the prime objective of the latter is to contribute 
to the results of the company itself, whereas the former aims 
primarily at contributing to society, using corporate resources. 
It is a difference of objectives, not of managing processes.
Nevertheless, the second model creates within the business 
administration sphere an organization characterized by its lack 
of profit objectives, exactly the opposite of the most emphasized 
business objective, profit. This fundamental difference between 
corporate foundations and their founding companies leads to 
questions about the possibility of extending to the former the 
management practices generally adopted by the latter. If the 
organization’s main objective is not the generation of profit, the 
most widely adopted business success indicator, how should 
foundations’ results be evaluated? What orientation and objec-
tives should be established for their management? What should 
be the management best practices for these organizations?
3. PRIVATE SOCIAL INVESTMENT
PSI is understood as social, cultural and environmental 
actions of public interest, voluntarily promoted or financed by 
companies or by the foundations and institutes created by them. 
These actions are characterized by being structured and long 
term. Investors are concerned with results and, therefore, in-
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stead of being called social, cultural or environmental expenses, 
they are called private social investments, as are productive 
investments of businesses.
Companies’ willingness to promote them derives from 
the perception that development, growth and sustainability of 
healthy businesses are irreconcilable with a society that has 
large social-economic situation differences among its segments. 
It derives, as well, from a business vision that companies, 
besides supplying their products and services, providing em-
ployment, paying taxes and having financial resources, have 
significant intangible resources, such as technical knowledge, 
management experience, planning and organization procedures 
and means of communication that can contribute to society’s 
development, complementing the efforts of the State, which 
is responsible for essential rights, such as safety, justice, basic 
health and education, and social assistance (FISCHER, 2002).
There is, however, a discussion as to whether it is suitable 
for companies to take on responsibility for social actions in their 
communities, based on two theoretical management concepts: 
the stockholders and the stakeholders theories. The former 
argues that the basic business function, to be primarily pursued 
by management, is to maximize profit, in order to optimize 
shareholders’ return on their investment (FRIEDMAN, 1970; 
SILVEIRA, 2006). The latter considers that the interests of 
the different parties (people and organizations) with which 
the company maintains relations are often conflicting among 
themselves and should be taken into account in business deci-
sions, so that profit maximization should not be an absolute 
target (FREEMAN, 1994; MACHADO FILHO, 2006).
The growing number of companies practicing PSI, either 
directly or through their foundations, is an indication that 
they operate by the stakeholders theory, as they dedicate part 
of their human, financial and technical resources to fulfilling 
the needs of stakeholders, beyond their shareholders. GIFE, 
a Brazilian association whose members include the largest 
private social investors in the country, was created in 1995, 
with 25 members; by 2000, there were 48; and by 2011, its 
membership listing comprised 130 companies, foundations 
and institutes (GIFE, 2011).
The growth in the number of organizations promoting PSI 
resulted in a significant increase of the financial resources 
dedicated to social action and of the people who benefited from 
them. In 2006, 91 GIFE members invested about R$1 billion in 
PSI, vs. R$480 million by 63 members in 2001 (GIFE, 2006, 
p.21). The number of beneficiaries evolved from almost two 
million to five million, between 2003 and 2005 (GIFE, 2006, 
p.15). In 2007, 80 members invested about R$1.15 billion and, 
in 2010, 110 members invest some R$1.9 billion (GIFE, 2011).
Social action carried out by businesses in Brazil goes well 
beyond PSI promoted by GIFE’s members, but there are no 
data on this investment. Taking into account all kinds of social 
actions driven by businesses, including the sporadic, occasional 
and purely philanthropic ones, except those legally required, 
IPEA(1) estimated that most Brazilian companies promote 
social action (IPEA, 2005), according to the Business Social 
Action investigation conducted in 2003 in the Northeast and 
Southeast regions of the country, which concentrate about 70% 
of all companies, 70% of Gross National Product (GNP) and 
78% of the Brazilian population.
4. ARE CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS PART  
 OF THE THIRD OR OF THE  
 “TWO AND A HALF” SECTOR?
Corporate foundations, as private-sector agents with public 
objectives, could be considered as part of the third sector organiz-
ations category (FERNANDES, 1994). An important set of at-
tributes to characterize organizations of this sector was proposed 
by Salamon and Anheier (1992) and complemented by Salomon 
(1999). According to these authors, to be part of the third sector 
(nonprofit sector in their terminology), organizations should be:
● formal – institutionalized, legally or otherwise, with rules 
and procedures to assure their permanency;
● private-sector – without institutional ties to the State, even 
if receiving State resources;
● non distributive of profits – although they may generate 
financial surpluses, these should not be their objective; this 
non-distribution constraint is particularly relevant;
● voluntary – employing a significant volume of voluntary 
effort “and created voluntarily, not by legal or contractual 
imposition” (added by the author);
● with public objectives – aiming at an external public as 
beneficiary, beyond the organization’s membership;
● autonomous – not controlled by external agents, with their 
own governance structure, being usually governed by a board. 
Corporate foundations do not necessarily fulfill this last 
attribute because, in many cases, they are dependent of the 
founding company for their management and financial support. 
One can therefore argue that although they have all the other 
characteristics of third sector organizations, they should not 
be considered as part of this sector, an argument with which 
Falconer (1999, p.33-34) agrees.
While third sector organizations are characterized by hav-
ing no owners, these foundations, although legally without 
shareholders, belong in general to the companies that instituted 
them. The majority of third sector organizations provide the 
financial resources they need through donations from a pulver-
ized set of individuals and legal entities that may or may not 
be associated with the organization. Corporate foundations, on 
the other hand, usually have their instituting company as the 
main source of funding. This resource dependency confers upon 
the companies a position analogous to that of shareholders, a 
condition often reinforced by corporate dispositions that confer 
upon the instituting company the power or the responsibility 
of naming the foundation’s main executives. Thus, although 
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from a legal standpoint the strategic direction and resource 
allocation definitions should be made by the most senior 
management body of these foundations (a governing board, a 
members meeting), the instituting company has a strong power 
to influence these decisions.
These distinctive characteristics of corporate foundations in 
relation to other nonprofit organizations as a whole are relevant 
and, therefore, it is important to take them into account when 
studying corporate foundations governance. Thus, it is conven-
ient to consider them as belonging to an intermediate sector 
between the second sector (that of businesses) and the third 
sector (that of nonprofit organizations). In this interface area, 
they appropriate specific attributes of each of those two sectors 
and begin to form what one might call the two and a half sector.
5. AGENCY CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE
Governance is a term employed in many contexts, always 
related to the act of governing, or to the structures required 
to do so. Houaiss and Villar (2001, p.1470) defines it as “the 
act of governing; government, governing”. Usually with the 
“corporate” qualification, the term is largely used in the second 
sector, typical of for-profit business organizations, especially 
the publicly listed ones.
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), an enti-
ty that promotes in Brazil a wider and more consistent study and 
use of the governance concept, defines it as a system whereby 
companies are directed and monitored, involving relationships 
among the shareholders, board of directors, executive board, 
independent auditing and fiscal committee, with the objective 
of increasing the organization’s value, fac ilitating its access to 
capital and contributing to its perpetuity (IBGC, 2006). 
IBGC itself explains the function of corporate governance 
based on business economics concepts:
“In traditional economic theory, corporate govern-
ance arises to try to overcome the so called ‘agency 
conflict’ present because the phenomenon of separa-
tion between business ownership and management 
occurs. The ‘principal’ property owner delegates 
to the ‘agent’ the decision-making power over this 
property. From this, the so-called agency conflicts 
emerge, as the interests of the party managing the 
property are not always aligned with those of its 
owner. From the agency theory perspective, the 
major concern is to create efficient mechanisms 
(monitoring and incentive systems) to guarantee that 
the interests of management are aligned with those 
of the shareholders” (IBGC, 2006).
Silveira (2006, p.45) also relates corporate governance to 
the issue of how to deal with the problems derived from agency 
conflicts, pointing out that:
“The discussion of the need to improve corporate 
governance in businesses emerged as an answer to 
several records of shareholders wealth expropriation 
by managers in companies with pulverized property 
structure and of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders in companies with concentrated proper-
ty structure. These records elapse from the agency 
problem of managers, which occur when managers 
make decisions with the intent of maximizing their 
personal utility and not the wealth of all sharehold-
ers, the reason they were hired for”.
Agency conflicts originate in agency relations, defined by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their work about the theory of 
the firm as
“[…] a contract whereby one or more persons (the 
principal or principals) hire another person (the 
agent) to execute a service on his [their] behalf, 
which involves delegating some decision power to 
the agent” (JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976, p.308).
As the two parties search to maximize their personal returns, 
there is good reason to suppose that the agent will not always 
act in the best interests of the principal, thereby creating agency 
conflicts. To minimize the gap in relation to his interests, the 
principal may create suitable incentives for the agent or may 
monitor the latter’s actions. In some cases, as necessary, the 
agent may offer guarantees that he will not act against the 
principal’s interests. These incentives, as well as the monitor-
ing and the possible guarantees have costs for both parties. It 
is practically impossible to ensure that, at zero cost, the agent 
will always make decisions that optimize the owners’ interests.
Machado Filho (2006, p.82) proposes that these cost are 
composed by the sum of
 “1. The residual losses characterized by shareholders 
 wealth decrease as a result of decisions made by 
 the managers (agents).
 2. The cost of monitoring the managers’ actions 
 (reports, balance sheets, managerial information 
 systems, disclosure).
 3. The cost of promoting transparency and accoun t- 
  ability of managers’ accounts.
 4. The expense of preparing contracts between the 
 managers and the shareholders”.
Given the governance concept based on the need to mini-
mize or overcome agency conflicts, basically originated from 
the separation between property and management in business 
organizations, it is important, in order to study governance in 
nonprofits, to consider whether in these organizations agency 
conflicts also occur, in the absence of shareholders or owners.
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) comment that agency costs 
occur in any situation that involves cooperative efforts, even if 
a clear principal-agent relationship does not exist. The authors 
indicate that the agency problem is general and occurs in any 
for-profit or nonprofit organization.
Machado Filho (2006, p.76), based on the agency conflicts 
concept, to which he refers as conflicts of interests, expands the 
governance concepts to other situations beyond the separation 
between property and management in organizations: 
“In any situation in which decision-making power 
is transferred or shared, informational asymmetry 
occurs, to a greater or lesser extent. In a private-
-sector company, club, association, cooperative or 
university there always will be conflicts of interest, 
derived from the delegation of some of the power. In 
other words, ‘someone’ governs in name of ‘some-
one else,’ who delegated rights for the exercise of 
power. In its essence, governance deals with mini-
mizing asymmetries and conflicts of interest inherent 
to power delegation” [Emphasis in the original].
Zylbersztajn (2005) considers that the agency conflict prob-
lem also occurs in nonprofit organizations, although there is no 
holder of property rights over the organization. According to 
this author, governance deals with the exercise of two property 
rights: the right to make decisions and the right to the flow of 
resources. In for-profit businesses, the possibility of conflicts 
occurring over the access to the flow of resources is clear, since 
the maximization of agents’ gains in the short term may lead to 
the reduction in principals’ gains in the long term. The agents 
have more access to information about the company’s business, 
a phenomenon known as informational asymmetry, and are 
therefore able to make decisions that favor themselves to the 
detriment of the principals.
In nonprofit organizations, the conflict over access to the 
flow of resources does not exist, since the nonprofit condition, 
the non-distribution constraint, excludes this component. 
However, conflicts of a different nature may occur between 
founders or maintainers, on one hand, and managers, on the 
other. According to Zylbersztajn (2005), in organizations whose 
subsistence depends on obtaining funding voluntarily provided 
to them in order for them to attain their aims, the principal is 
represented by a resources donor that wants to be sure that 
these resources will be used in actions and with objectives 
aligned with the entities’ mission. Agency conflicts may then 
arise from divergence about strategic decisions and resource 
allocation, even if one disregards the possibility of fraudulent 
deviation of funds.
Fama and Jensen (1983) have also advocated the applica-
bility of agency theory to nonprofit organizations. They argue 
that there are no residual rights in such organizations, which 
avoids agency problems between donors and residual rights 
owners, but does not eliminate the possible occurrence of 
agency problems between donors and decision-making agents 
who, lacking the burden of a major share of the effects of their 
decisions on assets, may appropriate themselves of the dona-
tions. The authors’ hypothesis is that
“as in other organizations characterized by separa-
tion between decision-making management and the 
responsibility for residual risk, nonprofit organiza-
tions have decision-making systems that separate 
management (proposition and implementation) from 
control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions. 
These decision-making systems survive in nonprofit 
organizations because they ensure that donations 
will be used effectively and not easily expropriated” 
(FAMA and JENSEN, 1983, p.319).
Thus, instead of considering the separation between prop-
erty and management, in nonprofit entities it is more appropriate 
to deal with the separation between control and management. 
This conceptual specificity, however, does not eliminate, but 
to the contrary, reinforces, the need for these organizations to 
implement governance practices that avoid the arising of con-
flicts of agency and/or interests and that assure the transparency 
of management actions and decisions. 
6. GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS 
Corporate foundations, as seen above, are a particular 
type of nonprofit organization, in that they are generally not 
autonomous, depending on their founding companies for their 
maintenance and receiving from the latter their strategic direc-
tives. In addition, they play an interconnection role between 
the companies, the third sector organizations and the public 
beneficiaries of PSI.
These foundations differ from other nonprofit concerns 
by maintaining ties, of variable degrees, with their founding 
company. They frequently continue to be a part of the corpo-
rate group that gave rise to them. Their directors’ ties with the 
organization are also, in general, different from those of the 
directors of other nonprofit concerns. While some of these di-
rectors are resource donors that sit on the board of the nonprofit 
organization to guarantee the proper use of their donations, 
the directors on the boards of corporate foundations are often 
executives of the founding company, that sit on the board to 
guarantee that the foundation’s strategy is aligned with that of 
the founding company.
Different ties also characterize the permanent relationship 
between the companies and the foundations, so that the latter 
may have a larger or smaller degree of autonomy in relation to 
the former. This autonomy may vary from total dependency, 
whether in terms of resources or of strategy and programs 
definition, to the opposite extreme of full detachment, in which 
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case the foundation has enough resources to fulfill its mission 
and autonomy to determine its strategy and action plans.
These relationships occur in a context in which there are 
no residual rights – taken as rights over financial results – to 
be appropriated by the management of the company or by the 
management of the foundations. However, the very mission 
of corporate foundations aimed at promoting private social 
investment creates a potential for agency conflicts to arise be-
tween them and their parent companies. Foundations’ actions 
are targeted at a cause (poverty reduction, defending the rights 
of a specific population segment, environmental protection, 
cultural enhancement) whereas companies’ actions target the 
market for their products and services.
In attempting to fulfill their mission, foundations carry out 
activities that target their audience and try to communicate the 
conceptual nature of their programs and actions. Their main 
objective is to contribute to their cause and to benefit their target 
audience. Companies, on the other hand, have the permanent 
need to increase their competitiveness in the market in which 
they operate: besides determining their products, services, price, 
quality and other attributes of their business, their reputation 
is a significant element for winning over and maintaining their 
customers. To upgrade this, the foundation contribution can be 
very relevant to the company’s institutional positioning con-
cerning their customers and the public in general (WESTHUES 
and EINWILLER, 2006).
One may consider, therefore, that corporate foundations 
have a dual mission: a social (or environmental or cultural) one, 
related to the cause and the target audience, and an institutional 
one, related to the strategic positioning and the reputational 
capital of the company. The latter’s contribution may be seen 
as the return on investment expected by the founding company, 
akin to shareholder expectations in relation to companies. One 
mission does not necessarily conflict with the other, but this 
duality can give rise to a large portion of the agency conflicts 
between the company and the foundation. These conflicts have 
a different nature from those between directors and managers, 
since they involve the predominant mission definition, and not 
the definition and ratification of decisions to fulfill the mission.
If the first mission, the social one, is fulfilled and properly 
communicated, so that the company’s public becomes aware 
of it, it will be contributing to the second one, of institutional 
character. On the other hand, if the first one does not contribute 
to the second or if the company stresses the institutional mis-
sion only, at the expense of the social mission, this can then 
become one source, among others, of conflicts.
Resource allocation, whether in terms of amounts or how 
these amounts are employed, may be the object of divergence 
between companies and their foundations. The foundation’s 
mission and the determination of its purpose, as mentioned by 
Miller-Millesen (2003), are a key issue in this relationship. The 
establishment of policies, financial controls, human resources 
management and directives as to where and how to allocate the 
foundation’s resources are among the important instruments 
that can be used to minimize agency conflicts in foundation 
management.
These distinguishing features of corporate foundations 
relative to other nonprofit organizations allow one to assume 
that the governance mechanisms proposed for nonprofits, 
themselves derived from those applied to business, may ope-
rate differently for the corporate organizations. The study that 
originated this article (MINDLIN, 2009) tried to establish 
whether the corporate governance mechanisms of for-profit 
organizations would be applicable to the management of foun-
dations and institutes founded by companies to promote their 
private social investment. Based on the analysis of governance 
mechanisms applied to nonprofits, as discussed by Mendonça 
and Machado Filho (2004) and further detailed by Machado 
Filho (2006), the following governance mechanisms were 
considered:
● Board of directors (board);
● Management compensation;
● Legal and regulatory system;
● Resources source – budgeting system.
To provide guidance for empirical data collection and 
analysis, the research investigation problem was broken down 
into the following guiding questions:
● Are the selected mechanisms applied in the organizations 
studied?
● Are they effective, i.e., do they yield the expected effects, or 
do they exist only formally, but do not operate?
● Are they compatible with those employed by the founding 
company?
● Are there other mechanisms applied to the corporate founda-
tions?
● Do these mechanisms yield a suitable degree of separation 
between control and management of the studied organiza-
tions?
7. METHODOLOGY – THE EXPLORATORY STUDY
Mindlin (2009) conducted an exploratory descriptive in-
vestigation, through case studies that combined secondary and 
primary qualitative data, which made it possible to characterize 
the management of the foundations studied, with emphasis on 
the governance mechanisms used.
The nature of the problem studied, in addition to the fact that 
there was little knowledge about it at the time, suggested that a 
qualitative approach was better suited to lead to an understand-
ing of governance processes. Reinforcing this methodological 
choice, Mindlin (2009) opted to analyze data in the form of 
case studies, which constitute 
“[…] a method of organizing social data that pre-
serves the unitary character of the social object un - 
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der study […] an approach that considers any social 
unit as a whole […] [and] includes the development 
of such a unit, which may be an individual, a family 
or another social group, a set of relationships or 
processes […] or even a culture […]” (GOODE and 
HART, 1968, p.422, apud GODOY, 2006, p.118- 
-119) [Author emphasis].
Besides providing a possibility of understanding a scarcely 
studied phenomenon, case studies, according to Godoy (2006, 
p.127) 
“[…] perform an important role by allowing explan-
atory hypotheses generation and theory elabora - 
tion, as Eisnehardt (1989) advocates”.
As for the empirical investigation, secondary data were 
obtained through annual reports published by the founding 
companies and the studied foundations, from information 
posted by those organizations on their internet sites, and from 
the analysis of the studied organizations’ bylaws, obtained in 
their sites or through the organizations themselves. 
To validate and complement the information collected, and 
to identify managers’ perceptions and opinions, primary data 
were collected through semi-structured interviews with the 
foundations’ main executives. The choice of personal inter-
views, instead of questionnaires that could have been sent by 
mail or email, was made based on the possibility of obtaining 
information not necessarily included in the interview script.
Consequently, the number of organizations included in the 
investigation was reduced, given the time required to obtain 
their agreement to take part in the research, the scheduling of 
the interviews and the interviewing itself.
7.1. Sample
The study covered eight organizations select among GIFE’s 
members headquartered in São Paulo or in nearby cities. There-
fore, this was not a random sample, statistically representative 
of the universe of corporate foundations and its small size and 
intentional selection do not permit generalized analyses, infer-
ences and conclusions.
This procedure was adopted due to the difficulty of gather-
ing information about the Brazilian institutes and foundations 
group that would have enabled selecting a random sample. No 
reference source that might be considered as a data bank of 
organizations from this universe was found.
Brazilian foundations are required to register with the Foun-
dations Curatorship, an organ of the Public Attorney’s Office. 
This registry, however, is decentralized by district, does not 
differentiate corporate foundations from the other types (public, 
independent or family ones) and lacks a structured data search 
system. Additionally, institutes, which take the legal form of 
associations, are not supervised by the Foundations Curatorship 
and are only required to register with the Documents Registry 
Office of their respective city, thus making their detection 
impossible for research purposes.
Given these difficulties, the GIFE membership listing was 
used as the source for selecting the sample. The GIFE members 
are institutes, foundations and companies that make private 
social investment. As of June, 2008, when the participating 
organizations were selected for the study, the association had 
114 members, 86 of which were corporate foundations or 
institutes. The remainder consisted either of companies or of 
family and independent foundations.
Of these 86, 40 were headquartered in São Paulo, from 
which a list of 21 was drawn. These were invited to participate 
in the study. This selection tried to include both organizations 
that qualified as Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse 
Público (OSCIPs)(2) and those that did not, as well those that 
were recognized as social assistance benefiting organizations 
(whether or not they had obtained the respective certificate, 
Certificação de Entidade Beneficente de Assistência Social 
– CEBAS(3)) and those that were not. It also tried to include 
organizations whose founding companies were listed with 
United States stock exchanges, which would make them subject 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley(4) act, as well as others that were not. For 
reasons of ease of access, preference was given to those based 
in the São Paulo metropolitan area or Campinas.
Of the 21 organizations invited to participate by an invi-
tation letter signed by the researcher, nine replied, eight af-
firmatively. The latter became the intentional sample of cases 
in this study.
8. THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE AND  
 THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION RESULTS
8.1. Board (of directors)
In corporate foundations, the board is a very relevant 
governance mechanism, considering its formal role of being 
the most senior body in charge of approving action plans and 
budgets and of electing the organization’s executive manage-
ment. In many cases, founding companies reserve the right 
to elect and destitute the directors; when they do not do this 
directly, they determine the mechanisms whereby directors are 
elected and dismissed. Company executives often sit on these 
boards, leading one to suppose that board members will be 
more interested in the foundation’s success and proper man-
agement than the board members of other nonprofit concerns, 
since directly or indirectly this influences the company’s image 
and even its results. Furthermore, because these directors are 
company executives, they are paid by it. Even if they are not 
compensated by the foundation, their performance tends to be 
more professional and less voluntary than that of the non-paid 
directors of nonprofits. The two factors – professional respon-
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sibility in the company and in the foundation, and remunerated 
activity – should contribute to the board members’ interest in 
the foundation’s management, in their active participation and 
in greater effectiveness.
However, the boards are not necessarily comprised only of 
company representatives. In principle, the situation of members 
from outside the company is similar to that of the directors of 
other nonprofit concerns, with voluntary participation and little 
representation of stakeholders.
The composition of the board of nonprofit concerns has been 
a frequently studied theme (STONE and OSTROWER, 2007), 
but not that of corporate foundations and institutes specifically. 
Thus, identifying these board composition criteria, the propor-
tion of company employees that sit on the foundation’s board, 
the origin and the ties of external members, and the role that 
they play might contribute to understanding how governance 
mechanisms, when adapted to the foundational model, operate 
and might be improved.
Besides the existence of the board of governors, the IBGC 
Corporate Governance Best Practices Code (IBGC, 2004) re - 
commends the existence of a consulting board, a fiscal com-
mittee and the hiring, by the board of directors, of independent 
auditing. These recommendations are also part of the Best 
Practices Guide for the Governance of Corporate Foundations 
and Institutions (IBGC, 2009). IBGC recommends further that 
the board chairman should not be the organization’s Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), that the board should organize 
committees to do deal with specific matters and to prepare 
recommendations for the board, especially an audit commit-
tee, and that every organization should have a code of conduct 
binding managers and employees, covering matters pertaining 
to conflict of interests and procedures to be adopted should 
such conflicts arise.
These questions were addressed in the field research. The 
Table below summarizes the characteristics of the boards of 
the eight foundations in the study that gave rise to this paper.
One can see that five of the studied organizations had a formal 
and specific board, but that one of them did not. Most of these 
boards was not really active and did not fulfill the functions set 
in the bylaws. In two cases, the board coincided with the found-
ing company’s board; in others, its duties were taken up by the 
board or some other body of the parent company. In only one 
case (F6) did the board have its own identity and proceedings.
Just two of these foundations had external members on their 
boards. These, however, had a consulting character in one of 
them and were dedicated to only one specific project in the other. 
In the remaining five organizations headed by a board, these 
were comprised solely of company representatives. In only one 
foundation was the existence of a consulting board observed, 
although it was not statutory. Another two also had non-statutory 
management bodies. Although almost all had fiscal committees, 
these were not active. Auditing procedures were not applied to 
the foundations independently from their founding companies.
The foundations studied operated, in general, as a functional 
area of their founding companies, monitored not by their boards, 
but by a company executive. These cases evidence a relative 
degree of autonomy regarding the institutions’ room for action, 
though more concentrated in their technical and conceptual 
aspects, and less in the decision-making area. Several managers 
manifested, however, that it was desirable for their organizations 
to operate in a more integrated fashion with their companies, 
even to the detriment of autonomy, if their area of technical and 
conceptual competence was preserved. They expressed that what 
differentiates managing a corporate foundation from managing 
a nonprofit independent organization is the need to integrate it 
with the company, to migrate to strategic social investment, 
Characteristics of the Boards of the Foundations Studied
                          Foundations
Boards F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 Frequency 
Structured X * X X X X X 6X
Active * * * * X * 1X / 5*
Specific X X X X X 5X
Coincide with Company X X 2X
Company Members X X X X X 5X
External Members X X 2X
Foundation Decisions X 1X
Company Decisions X X X X X 5X
Both Decisions X X 2X
Non Statutory Organs X X X 3X
Fiscal Board X X X X X X X 7X
Note: X means characteristic observed; * means partially observed.
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which creates value both for society and the business, correlat-
ing further the business and the social strategies.
This tends to confirm the earlier suggestion of situating 
corporate foundations in the two and a half sector, and may 
represent the core of the potential agency conflicts between 
the maintaining company’s management and the foundation’s 
technical and executive bodies.
The study observed that board members usually lacked solid 
knowledge about the organizations’ specific field of action and 
that boards had no room for stakeholder representation. There-
fore, the boards did not operate as proper monitoring and incen-
tive mechanisms and although they had the outward appearance 
of governance structures, they did not actually play this role.
8.2. Managers compensation
For corporate foundations, unlike other nonprofit organiza-
tions, there is the possibility of variable compensation instru-
ments related to the financial results of the company being used 
to manage the foundation’s staff. However, it is not obvious 
how a variable compensation policy can be used to align a 
foundation’s activities with shareholder interests, as the influ-
ence of the foundation’s managers actions over the company’s 
financial results may be very small and difficult to determine. 
The more the company attributes to the foundation part of the 
responsibility for the company’s overall success, related to its 
positioning and to the company’s institutional image and its 
reputation, the more these variable compensation policies may 
operate as governance instruments.
Five of the studied foundations adopted variable compensa-
tion practices. Of these, only one did not relate the goals to the 
organization’s own actions. All of them reported that variable 
compensation amounts were influenced by the company’s 
financial results, as the company was the non-profit institu-
tion’s resource provider. Still, it is interesting to note that the 
foundations’ budgets were small in relation to the companies’ 
income and financial results. Therefore, the potential impact 
if the foundations’ management over the financial corporate 
results could only be very modest. Consequently, tying the 
variable compensation of the foundation managers to the com-
pany’s financial performance goals should have no impact as 
an incentive mechanism.
It thus makes sense that the amount of incentives be un-
related with the company’s results, being tied, instead, to the 
foundations’ performance goals.
8.3. Legal and regulatory system
Brazilian corporate foundations may qualify as OSCIPs, 
provided that they comply with the provisions of Law 9790/99, 
requiring them to create a fiscal committee, to be subject to 
external and independent auditing, to adopt administrative 
practices that comply with the principles of legality, imper-
sonality, morality, publicity, cost effectiveness and efficiency, 
and to publish their financial statements and activity reports. 
Thus, this law’s regulatory guide can function as a governance 
mechanism, even if it is just a first step. Empirically, the ques-
tion to be considered is whether the structures required by these 
legal norms are in effect created in the foundations qualified as 
OSCIP and how they operate in practice.
Another law that may affect the administrative practices and 
governance mechanisms of Brazilian corporate foundations is 
the United States Sarbanes-Oxley act. Although it is an Ameri-
can law, foreign companies whose stock is traded on US stock 
exchanges or that are subsidiaries of companies whose stock is 
traded in the USA are required to comply with it, applying it to 
all companies under their control, including their foundations. 
The requirements include transparency, accountability and 
preventing conflicts of interest in order to protect the interests 
of society and minority shareholders.
Among the foundations studied, although four of them 
qualified as OSCIPs and their bylaws incorporated all formal 
OSCIP requirements, compliance with these requirements 
tended to be a formality rather than a driver of actual actions: 
foundation managers were compensated by the company (the 
law allows compensation by the foundations without loss of tax 
rebates), fiscal committees were not active and the disclosure 
of the foundations’ activities was conducted by the company, 
through its annual reports. Even so, as these organizations were 
the youngest in the sample, this might indicate that qualifying 
as an OSCIP may be an emerging trend.
Four of the founding companies in the sample were subject 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley law. Nevertheless, no influence of this 
was observed in their foundations’ governance. On the contrary, 
even in these four organizations, interviewed managers were 
unaware of this law and of its possible effects over corporate 
foundations’ governance practices.
8.4. Budgeting system
The budgeting system was considered an external gov-
ernance mechanism of corporate foundations, akin to what 
the stock markets represents for companies. Three of the or-
ganizations studied had a pre-established rule for budgeting: 
endowment income, percent of company sales and multi-annual 
plan. The other five had budgets determined on a yearly ba-
sis. The former case, contrary to expectations, did not confer 
upon foundations more autonomy from their companies, but 
rather denoted stronger commitment of these companies to 
their foundations’ actions. In the latter case, it was neither 
possible to observe whether the budget bore any relation with 
the attainment of targets nor whether the budget worked as an 
incentive mechanism for the foundations’ managers. None of 
the eight foundations made any use of their companies’ tax 
rebates, though some supported selecting projects in which their 
companies had invested ECA(5) and Rouanet Law(6) benefits.
470 R.Adm., São Paulo, v.47, n.3, p.461-472, jul./ago/set. 2012
Sérgio Ephim Mindlin
9. CONCLUSION
A number of recommendations can be extracted from this 
study: first, the cases studied suggest that it makes sense to dis-
tinguish corporate foundations as a particular type of nonprofit 
organization and to categorize them as part of a specific sector 
of organizational typology, the proposed naming of which is 
the two and a half sector. This denomination aims to make it 
explicit that these organizations have characteristics derived 
in part from the business sector, the second sector, and in part 
from the so-called civil society organizations, the third sector. 
This theoretical distinction was mainly based on the lack of 
autonomy of corporate foundations in relation to their founding 
companies. The case studies evidenced that the observed organ-
izations had limited autonomy and, to a large extent, despite 
being separate legal entities, maintained a strong operational 
and managerial dependency on their founders.
Second, the boards, considered in the literature as the main 
governance mechanism of both for-profit and nonprofit organ-
izations, have, in general, relations with the foundations and 
performance levels below the importance of their role. In most 
cases, the governing boards were comprised of company repre-
sentatives, who lacked in-depth knowledge of the foundations’ 
field of action and neither represented nor were aware of the 
needs of the different stakeholders. It was found that some board 
members were not qualified to support and provide guidance 
for the foundations’ executives in the conduction their work. 
It is likely that the debates to outline strategic directives might 
be more productive for the foundation’s mission (institutional 
as well as social) if the boards were comprised of people with 
more varied competences, embracing management and social 
investment themes.
The recommendation extracted from the analyses is that 
corporate foundations’ boards will become more effective 
and will in effect help these organizations to fulfill their dual 
missions if they are comprised of people with more varied 
competences (representing the different stakeholders; having 
knowledge about social and business needs; being active and 
meeting regularly; and making use of information plus moni-
toring and encouraging the foundations’ action instruments). 
This does not mean that the foundations in this study were 
ineffective, but rather that they could perform their work better.
This recommendation may be an orientating hypothesis 
for future investigations, with studies that examine not only 
governance mechanisms and governing boards in particular, 
but address, specifically, the evaluation of results and the fulfill-
ment of foundations’ missions. Several research possibilities and 
needs derive from this proposition: studying, in practice, the very 
existence of the dual nature of the mission and its consequences; 
researching how best to evaluate foundations’ performance, with 
which indicators and how; and conducting longitudinal studies 
that make it possible to investigate cause and effect relationships.
Another governance mechanism to be studied further is the 
legal regulatory system. Additional studies about its influence 
on corporate foundation management are necessary, as well as 
analyses of the nonprofit organizations regulatory code and, in 
particular, of the aspects that concern corporate foundations. 
Almost all cases studied indicate little adherence, in practice, 
to legal requirements, although they were formally fulfilled. 
The diversity of certifications creates breaches enabling a lack 
of effective oversight and of management guidance, as the 
internal governance efficacy depends on the strength of legal 
institutional guidelines.
Finally, despite the difficulties for instituting variable com-
pensation for the foundations’ managers and staff, an important 
step toward making this governance mechanism effective 
would be to improve the human resources management of these 
organizations with policies and procedures adapted to their 
specificity. The practice observed was that the human resources 
systems of founding companies are in general adopted for the 
foundations. This does not seem to consider the specific needs 
of this two and a half sector.
There is still a long way to go in the corporate foundations 
and institutions governance study and research field. The study 
that gave rise to this paper is one of the few conducted in Brazil 
on this subject. It is hoped that the observations and analyses 
presented here will stimulate the expansion of this research line, 
benefiting theoretical development as well as the management 
of these organizations, and helping them to fulfill their public 
mission more effectively.
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S (1) IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada): 
Applied Economics Research Institute, a federal 
public foundation of the Bureau of Strategic Issues 
of the Presidency.
(2) OSCIP (Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interes- 
se Público): Public Interest Civil Society Organiza-
tion. Legal qualification of nonprofit organizations 
instituted by law 9790/99. It created transparency 
requirements and management qualifications and 
contributed to the professionalization of these or-
ganizations by allowing their executive management 
to be paid.
(3) CEBAS (Certificação de Entidade Beneficente de 
Assistência Social): Social Assistance Beneficent 
Entity Certificate. Legal qualification of nonprofit 
organizations that perform direct social assistance. It 
also exempts them from paying the employers social 
benefits contribution.
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(4) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the United 
States in 2002, after accounting frauds such as those 
of Enron and Worldcom were revealed in 2001. It 
created a number of requirements regarding trans-
parency, accountability and mechanisms to protect 
minority shareholder rights.
(5) ECA (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente): Child 
and Adolescent Statute (Law number 8069/90). 
Its provisions include the possibility of companies 
deducting up to 1% of their income tax due, if they 
make donations to the Children and Adolescents 
Funds that exist in every municipality and state, and 
at the federal level as well. 
(6) The Rouanet Law (Law number 8313/91) instituted 
fiscal incentives for the promotion of culture and al-
lows companies to deduct up to 4% of their income 
tax due if the funds are invested in projects approved 
by the Ministry of Culture.
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A study of governance practices in corporate foundations
Implementation of social investments through corporate foundations is growing and, therefore, it is important to 
study their governance aspects better. Governance is conceptualized as a set of control and incentive mechanisms 
to overcome the so-called agency conflicts, which originate from the separation of property and management in for- 
-profit organizations, a concept also applied to nonprofit institutions. It is argued that corporate foundations have the 
characteristics both of companies and of civil society organizations, which distinguishes them from both types of 
organizations. This paper analyses a study in which a set of governance mechanisms, adapted from those identified 
by a literature review of corporate and nonprofit governance, was selected for study. It is an exploratory descriptive 
case study, which analyzed data about eight organizations collected through publications and interviews with their 
CEOs. The data analysis indicates that it is appropriate to distinguish the different organization types and to apply 
the agency theory. Research results indicate that the selected governance mechanisms may be adapted and used in 
corporate foundations. However, they are only partially applied in the observed cases, which suggests the need for 
further studies that might consolidate these practices in such organizations.
Keywords: corporate foundations, governance, agency theory.
Estudio de las prácticas de gobierno en fundaciones empresariales
Es creciente la realización de inversiones sociales por medio de fundaciones empresariales y, por lo tanto, es importante 
que se profundice el estudio de su gobierno. Gobierno se conceptualiza como un conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo 
y control para superar los llamados conflictos de agencia, que tienen origen en la separación entre propiedad y gestión 
de las empresas, concepto también aplicable a organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. Se argumenta que las fundaciones 
empresariales presentan características tanto de empresas como de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, por lo cual 
se distinguen de las organizaciones de esos dos sectores. En este trabajo se analiza un estudio en el cual un conjunto 
de mecanismos de gobierno, basado en los mecanismos que aparecen en la literatura de gobierno de empresas y de 
organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro, fue seleccionado para estudio. Es un estudio de casos, descriptivo y exploratorio, 
en el que se recolectaron y analizaron datos sobre ocho organizaciones por medio de publicaciones y de entrevistas a 
sus principales ejecutivos. El análisis de los datos indica que es adecuado distinguir entre los tipos organizacionales 
y también aplicar la teoría de agencia. Los resultados indican que los mecanismos de gobierno seleccionados pueden 
ser adaptados y aplicados a las fundaciones empresariales. Sin embargo, en la realidad estudiada, son aplicados sólo 
parcialmente, lo que sugiere la necesidad de ampliar los estudios que puedan consolidar esas prácticas en dichas 
organizaciones.
Palabras clave: fundaciones empresariales, gobierno, teoría de agencia.
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